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Abstract
Power index research has been a very active field in the last decades. Will
this continue or are all the important questions solved? We argue that there
are still many opportunities to conduct useful research with and on power
indices. Positive and normative questions keep calling for theoretical and
empirical attention. Technical and technological improvements are likely
to boost applicability.
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1 Introduction
The 750-page tome “Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After” which
was edited by Holler and Nurmi (2013) demonstrates that the last three decades
of research on power indices have been very productive. Can this go on? Or,
as Manfred J. Holler put it: “Is there a future to power index research?” –
addressing a scientific community that has seen several protagonists nominally
retire of late.
The fact that two of us have only started to do research on power indices in
the 2010s attests to our firm conviction that there is. There exists a set of diverse
topics on which progress can still be made, and will be made.
The two recent articles on allocating voting weights in two-tier systems which
have been published the most prominently (Barbera´ and Jackson, 2006; Koriyama
et al., 2013) barely mention classical power measures. This may be regarded as
a dark cloud in the sky of power index research. Top economics journals are
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concerned first and foremost with the welfare properties of voting systems. Power
comes as a distant second or even third (behind epistemic concerns). But welfarist
approaches to voting, which focus on measures of success rather than pivotality,
can be viewed as part of power index research defined in a sufficiently liberal
way. Moreover, we see no evidence that voting power faces greater suspicion
from mainstream economists today than in the past.
We are convinced that today’s prospects for power index research are no worse
than 30 years ago. Our academic weather forecast is therefore: mostly sunny!
Power index research will have a productive future. The specific topics which we
expect to be addressed can be grouped loosely into three areas. In Section 2, we
focus on the positive analysis of voting bodies. We then adopt a more normative,
design-oriented perspective in Section 3. A range of technical issues for which
progress is likely are discussed in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Positive Analysis
Voting is important for the lives of billions of people. It shapes democratic par-
ticipation at all levels of legislature and matters for decision making in boards or
committees in the workplace. It also plays a role in non-governmental organiza-
tions, sports associations, and possibly even the decision on the next family trip
(e.g., Darmann et al., 2012). As soon as voting and collective decision making
come with a minimum of structure, power indices turn out to be useful.
More countries seem to adopt rather than abandon democratic governance
structures, multinational organizations gain importance and decision-making bod-
ies which use weighted voting evolve or are even newly created (see, e.g., Belke
and Styczynska, 2006, on the Governing Council of the European Central Bank).
Modern communication technology facilitates the coordination of geographically
dispersed actors in associations and interest groups. Such organizations rely more
and more on formal decision rules compared to consensus over coffee or beer. Re-
form suggestions for the most usual suspects for applications of power indices –
the Council of the EU, the UN Security Council, the Board of Governors of the
IMF – show no signs of fading. It is hence easy to affirm: the use of power indices
in applied studies will continue. Some type of power index analysis is necessary
in order to discover unevenness of the democratic playing field, which may be
hidden behind vectors of weights, veto rules, thresholds, and quorums; it is also
needed in order to assess rule changes.
We predict that old distinctions and divisions in the literature will lose impor-
tance, however. For instance, there exists a wide spectrum between (a) puristic
a priori analysis, which purposely ignores any preference patterns of the past in
favor of the far-reaching independence and symmetry assumptions that under-
lie the Penrose-Banzhaf index (PBI) or Shapley-Shubik index (SSI; see Felsen-
thal and Machover, 1998, or Laruelle and Valenciano, 2008a, for definitions and
discussion), and (b) a posteriori analysis which places specific voters, say, indi-
vidual members of the US Congress or Supreme Court, on locations in a multi-
dimensional policy space in order to identify the critical Senators or judges for
a given decision. Many normative studies of two-tier voting systems take corre-
2
lation between members of the same constituency behind the constitutional veil
of ignorance. Why not do the same in positive analysis of, say, the IMF or EU?1
The “veil of ignorance” is the most prominent motivation for independence and
symmetry presumptions. But some asymmetries other than voting weights are
often part of the game. For instance, some EU members use proportional and
others first-past-the-post systems in order to determine their Council delegates.
Some members of the IMF have preferential trade agreements or even share the
same currency, others not. This deserves to be accounted for. To some extent,
power indices based on games with a priori unions or a restricted communication
structure have always held a middle ground between pure a priori and a poste-
riori analysis (see Owen, 1977, and Myerson, 1977, for pioneering work). But
we see scope for more. And we predict that increased public transparency and
improved technology for analyzing voting data will create a bias towards the a
posteriori end of the range.2
Other dichotomies will also very fruitfully be replaced by a more pluralistic ap-
proach. Helpful as binary distinctions like a priori and a posteriori, full approval
vs. rejection, P-power vs. I-power, take-it-or-leave-it committees vs. bargaining
committees, etc. may be, they always narrow one’s perspective. The attempt,
e.g., to delineate the power to influence a collective decision (“I-power” in the for
some time widely followed terminology of Felsenthal and Machover, 1998) from
the power to appropriate the surplus or “prize” generated by it (“P-power”) is
certainly praiseworthy. But the seemingly crisp juxtaposition blurs the fact that
both are intertwined, i.e., the distinction is fuzzy at best. It can therefore be
highly misleading to base a categorization of available power indices on it.3 It
also makes a difference whether a decision making body can only adopt or reject
an exogenous proposal (classified as a “take-it-or-leave-it committee” by Laruelle
and Valenciano, 2008a) or if committee members bargain in search of agreement
over a set of feasible alternatives (a “bargaining committee” according to Laruelle
and Valenciano). But it makes a similarly big difference whether the proposals
that are fed into a take-it-or-leave-it committee are composed strategically by
an agenda setter who knows committee members’ interests or whether they are
truly exogenous; or whether the set of feasible alternatives that are negotiated in
a bargaining committee is binary (declare independence or not), one-dimensional
(tax rates, emission thresholds) or higher-dimensional (division of a monetary
surplus).
With less “dichotomism” and a yet more diverse set of tools, future power
index research will be better prepared to analyze the diverse voting bodies in the
field. Ternary voting games (Felsenthal and Machover, 1997) allow more accurate
positive analysis of, say, power in the UN Security Council; quaternary dichoto-
mous voting rules (Laruelle and Valenciano, 2012) provide yet more flexibility.
1Kaniovski (2008) has made promising progress in this direction.
2See, for instance, the use by Badinger et al. (2013) of web scraping tools that are provided
at http://api.epdb.eu/ in order to gather a data set of almost 70,000 individual voting decisions
of EU member states on more than 3,000 proposals.
3For instance, the PBI is commonly classified as a measure of I-power but also captures
P-power in some situations (see Felsenthal and Machover, 1998, p. 45). The SSI is frequently
classified as a measure of P-power but also captures I-power in relevant contexts (see Napel
and Widgre´n, 2008; Kurz et al. 2014a).
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Still more general frameworks for measuring power as pivotality or as outcome
sensitivity have been suggested by Bolger (1993) and Napel and Widgre´n (2004).
The latter framework is suited also to analyzing collective decision-making in
sequential legislative procedures, which involve strategic interaction between the
relevant players. The so-called “ordinary legislative procedure” of the European
Union, formerly referred to as “codecision procedure”, has proposals made or
amended by three different voting bodies in several readings and the possibility
of bargaining in a “conciliation committee”. Positive analysis of the balance of
power between European Commission, individual members of the Council, and
the European Parliament therefore requires more than, say, a PBI calculation.4
The fact that conventional indices like the PBI or SSI are so much more
convenient to compute has probably biased applied research in their favor – to
the detriment of more complicated but perhaps more appropriate methodology.
This adverse fate has presumably also affected the nucleolus of voting games.
Montero (2006) has provided a very convincing motivation for its use as a power
measure when bargaining takes place in the shadow of a voting rule. To our
knowledge, however, its application to the EU Council by Le Breton et al. (2012)
has been the first and only. Fortunately, given that we expect progress on the
computational ease of power index research (see Section 4), we predict a brighter
future for both the nucleolus and strategic analyses of voting procedures.
The blunt question “Which is the right power index?” has fortunately been
replaced by more subtle ones, asking which of various properties that go with
distinct indices or methods fit a specific application best. Different members of
the community naturally differ in their answers. The Holler-Packel index (see
Holler and Packel, 1983), for instance, is vigorously advocated by some while
others group it under “minor indices” and hold that “any reasonable measure of
a priori voting power . . .must respect dominance” (which the Holler-Packel index
does not – see Felsenthal and Machover, 2005; 1998, p. 245). Many scholars have
expressed a pronounced preference for the PBI over the SSI at workshops and
conferences; others have done the opposite.
This subjectivity and apparent arbitrariness is a cloud in the sky of power
index research, at least from many outsiders’ perspective. Fortunately, the liter-
ature has started to address the details of what constitutes power in which types
of voting situations and what is the predictive value of power indices on a wider
empirical basis. So far, laboratory experiments have been the method of choice.
They provide maximal control over the aspects of a voting situation that deter-
mine a power index’s potential value added. Montero et al. (2008), for instance,
have conducted an experiment that empirically demonstrates the paradox of new
members, which was a key prediction of power index analysis. Tentative support
for the SSI and PBI has been found by Geller et al. (2004). More experimental
power index research can be expected – someday perhaps even in the field.
A related area in which future empirical research could be promising is con-
cerned with people’s preferences for different voting systems. Can preferences
for these be explained by the respective distribution of voting power, as mea-
sured by a particular index? How do people trade off procedural concerns (e.g.,
4See Mayer et al. (2013) on analysis of the codecision procedure for EU28, and Felsenthal
et al. (2003, p. 490) on the “informational poverty” of traditional power indices.
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for equal swing probabilities) and personal success propensities? Weber (2014)
provides first evidence that subjects have a preference for voting systems that
allocate Shapley-Shubik power to group representatives proportionally to group
size. These systems are preferred over ones more in line with Penrose’s square
root rule to an extent that is not explicable by classic consequentialism.
3 Normative Analysis
The increased pluralism predicted for positive analysis has its natural analogues
– and has in some cases been preceded by developments – in normative analysis.
We already pointed to an improved account of given asymmetries in constitu-
tional analysis. If, for instance, it is a restriction for the design of a two-tier
voting system that the considered population partition must not be changed into
constituencies of equal size, then it is appropriate to also take the reason for this
restriction behind the veil of ignorance. More generally, power index research will
do well to go beyond maximal symmetry and independence of voters.
Investigations of the “optimal” design of two-tier voting systems have branched
into numerous different objective functions since the seminal investigation by Pen-
rose (1946). Equality of voting power or of expected utility across individuals,
maximal welfare under different utilitarian assumptions, minimal discrepancy be-
tween the outcomes of a two-tier vs. a direct voting system (with “discrepancy”
operationalized by the probability of obtaining different outcomes or some no-
tion of average outcome distance), and minimal discrepancy between weights and
induced voting powers have all been considered.5 The great majority of the stud-
ies have, however, remained faithful to Penrose’s original binary setup, i.e., have
considered a collective decision between two exogenously given alternatives (say,
a random legislative proposal vs. the status quo). Neither voter abstention is
considered nor the possibility of three or more ordered policy alternatives. Also
the cases that binary proposals arise endogenously from strategic agenda setting
or from two-party competition remain to be explored.
We forecast more departures from the conventional binary focus. There are
still few: Laruelle and Valenciano (2008b) and Le Breton et al. (2012) have an-
alyzed delegated bargaining over a simplex of policy alternatives, i.e., problems
of rent division. Maaser and Napel (2007; 2012; 2014) have used Monte Carlo
simulation in order to study influence-based, majoritarian, and welfarist objec-
tive functions in a median voter environment with an interval of policy options.
Asymptotically optimal assignments of weights in the latter environment have
been analytically characterized by Kurz et al. (2014a) for a democratic fairness
objective similar to Penrose’s. Because more than two policy alternatives give
rise to population size effects on the distribution of delegate attitudes, it is sur-
prising that the pattern obtained from binary setups has re-appeared also for a
5This list should still grow. Design of two-tier voting systems with epistemic goals or explicit
minority protection constraints are promising research areas. It is also an open issue to cope
with multiple normative criteria simultaneously. For instance, equitable representation in UNO
or IMF can relate to countries’ population sizes but also financial and other contributions to
the common objective. No single “optimal rule” may exist; but which rules are Pareto-maximal
with respect to a given set of criteria?
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continuum of alternatives. Namely, optimal weights relate to the square root of
population sizes in case of independent voters but plain proportionality is called
for in case of at least mildly correlated constituency members. But the cases in
between – with a finite number but more than two alternatives – have not been
systematically studied so far. Preliminary computations indicate that the square
root finding for independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) voter attitudes
may actually break down. Future research will clarify whether famous square
root results are knife-edge not only with respect to their i.i.d. assumption but
perhaps also with regard to allowing only two policy options.
A one-dimensional interval of alternatives already allows to analyze economic
questions that would otherwise not be covered (e.g., scope of regulation, spending
on climate change mitigation, monetary policy); it would be desirable to extend
the analysis to multidimensional spaces. Future research in this vein will have
to deal with the “curse of multidimensionality”. One possibility could be to use
point solutions, like the Copeland winner, which exist even if the generalized
median voter does not. Another possibility is to assume an exogenous ordering of
dimensions on which individuals vote sequentially (see De Donder et al., 2012).
So far, power index research and its normative applications to representative
democracy have stayed closely in the tracks of winner-takes-all systems, which
are easily modeled by weighted voting games. Other democratic systems like
proportional rule or mixed-member systems have been neglected. We forecast
that this will change. Edelman (2004), for instance, has considered the ideal
composition of a legislature that contains representatives from equipopulous dis-
tricts and some number of at-large representatives if the objective is to maximize
the total Banzhaf power of individual citizens. Other scenarios with two (or
even more) types of legislators, representing different interests of the electorate,
are conceivable and will be studied in the future. What, for instance, should a
mixed-member legislature or a two-chamber legislature ideally look like if vot-
ers have interests along ethnic and economic dimensions, which can be either
independent or aligned in complicated ways?
4 Tools and Technical Issues
As in research more generally, the types of power investigations carried out depend
on the available mathematical and computational tools. Substantial progress has
been made regarding the efficient computation of power indices. Free software
packages make it easy to calculate power indices for applied researchers who do
not want to write their own programs; it is possible to adapt published code to a
specific application (see, e.g., Mace´ and Treibich , 2012).
Understandably, the availability of software is biased towards the most pop-
ular conventional indices, namely the PBI and the SSI. But popularity is also
a consequence of availability. We are unaware, for example, of any online tool
which would allow an applied researcher to compute the nucleolus. For a 27-
member assembly, as considered by Le Breton et al. (2012), its computation is
an almost insurmountable obstacle for non-experts. So we see a future for more
easy-to-use software, especially for the computation of technically more demand-
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ing constructs (as, e.g., also the minimum sum representation index recently
introduced by Freixas and Kaniovski, 2014). For power analysis based on convex
policy spaces, algorithmic considerations are still in their infancy.
There is room for improvements even in the computation of SSI and PBI.
Namely, the efficiency of the most widely used generating function approach
(see Alonso-Meijide et al., 2012) relies heavily on working with small integer
weights. This is in stark contrast with population figures in the millions being
used as weights in the EU’s Council. Large weights can also arise when trying
to implement Penrose’s square root rule as well as possible. Techniques have
recently been developed to compute equivalent representations with smaller or
even the minimum integer weights (see, e.g., Kurz, 2012a). These may in the
future prove worthwhile for index computations, too.
Another important technical issue is the so-called “inverse problem” of power
indices: for a given target distribution of power according to, say, the PBI or the
SSI, one seeks to find a voting rule which induces this distribution as closely as
possible for a given notion of distance. If one does not want to rely on simple
heuristics, which mostly lack provable qualities such as a known maximal distance
to the optimal solution, the problem is computationally very expensive (see De
et al., 2012, and Kurz, 2012b). Progress can still be made regarding a better
understanding of common heuristics (Kurz and Napel, 2014) and regarding the
efficient – ideally also user-friendly – implementation of exact algorithms. The
usefulness of, e.g., the integer linear programming techniques employed by Kurz
(2012b) will benefit from steadily improving computer hardware; it is also con-
ceivable that the complete list of distinct weighted voting games with up to nine
players will in coming years become searchable online.
We also forecast progress in the pure theory of power indices. The distribution
of inducible power vectors within the unit simplex is, also for the classical PBI
or SSI, more mystery than understood. In a seminal recent paper, Alon and
Edelman (2010) have shown that even for large numbers of players some target
PBI distributions can be reached only with a large and constant relative error.
Their work is in the process of being extended to other power indices (see Kurz,
2014).
Another theoretical issue of practical relevance is the possible coincidence
of voting weights and power – either in an exact or asymptotic sense. It was
shown only recently that the nucleolus of non-oceanic weighted majority games
converges to the relative weight distribution (see Kurz et al., 2014b). The same
article provided a new sufficient condition for exact coincidence of nucleolus and
weights, which future research can presumably weaken. Coincidence of power
and weights has also been studied recently by Houy and Zwicker (2014) for the
PBI. Analogous findings for the SSI remain to be developed. The first attempt by
Leech (2013) to develop an asymptotic result for power indices which covers both
oceanic and non-oceanic games has turned out to misstate rather than generalize
findings by Lindner and Machover (2004). But the goal was worthwhile, and we
forecast that it will be achieved in future research.
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5 Concluding Remarks
Above selection of topics for which we expect power index research to remain
fruitful is biased by our own curiosities. That the collection is obviously too big
an agenda for us alone, however, indicates the wide scope for continuing with or
moving into power index research.
This scope becomes even wider if one also considers topics that are more
distantly related to voting power. For instance, the quantifications of causal
responsibility by Braham and van Hees (2009) or Felsenthal and Machover (2009)
draw more or less explicitly on power analysis of non-strategic binary voting.
Carrying methods and insights from non-binary strategic voting over into this
domain looks promising. The domain of conventional power index research has
also been left by Koster et al.’s (2014) investigation of the predictive value of
knowing an individual voter’s decision or voting inclination. Taking the latter as
input into a model of an opinion formation process could merge traditional power
analysis with the analysis of social dynamics and networks.
Finally, indices and techniques that have been popularized by voting appli-
cations can prove useful in completely unrelated contexts. For example, Kovacic
and Zoli (2013) compute the PBI with relative population shares of different eth-
nicities as “weights” in an analysis of ethnic conflict. They find that a PBI-based
approach can explain onset of conflict better than using existing indices of ethnic
diversity.
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